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Abstract Mediation is a dispute resolution process whereby agents reach a mutually
acceptable agreement among different proposals that satisfy a set of principles. This
paper provides a natural way of coming to such agreements in claims problems. In our
approach, mediation combines (i) a set of fair properties (legitimate principles); and
(ii) a criterion for delimiting the admissible manners of distributing the endowment,
that is determined by themediator expressing the two (dual) points of view to face such
problems: awards and losses. These dual views define a lower and an upper bounds
on awards, which are used to implement the so-called Double Recursive Process. We
find that this process concludes at the midpoint between the two dual points of view.
Finally, we argue that the criterion of the mediator could be established throughout
Lorenz domination. In so doing, we retrieve the average of old and well-known rules.
Keywords Claims problems · Midpoint · Bounds · Recursivity · Self-duality
JEL Classification C71 · D63 · D71
1 Introduction
How should scarce resources be allocated among claimants? Such problems, in which
the available quantity of a perfectly divisible good (or endowment) is not sufficient to
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satisfy the aggregate claim against the good, are known as claims problems. The formal
analysis of these situations, which originates in a seminal paper by O’Neill (1982),
proposes a number of well-behaved rules recommending a division of the resources
among agents that depends both on the endowment and on the agents’ claims. The
term “well-behaved” indicates that these rules may satisfy principles of fairness or
other appealing properties. In this context, how can claimants commit to a distribution
of resources? How can claimants agree on the properties that must be applied to solve
such a problem?
Nowadays, conflicts in which two or more agents cannot decide the allocation have
been resolved by a trial. In such cases, a neutral third agent (the mediator) dictates
the manner by which the endowment is distributed. This is the philosophy behind
mediation, as used in legal, commercial, family and public policy disputes. More
precisely, the World Mediation Forum defines mediation “as a process by which a
neutral third agent, called a mediator, helps agents in conflict to negotiate a mutually
acceptable agreement.”
Accordingly, we analyse the figure of a mediator taking as our starting point claims
problems with legitimate principles. To this respect, Giménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil
(2014) synthesize earlier work to thoroughly analyse the consequences of enrich-
ing the classical model of rationing by adding an additional element, P, that repre-
sents the legitimate principles set. This set consists of a group of some fair axioms
or properties that are commonly accepted by the agents, or that are imposed by
law and tradition. Nevertheless, fairness hardly leads to a unique commitment: the
same claims problem faced by two different agents may lead to the use of two dif-
ferent points of view (Moulin 1988; Schokkaert and Overlaet 1989; Young 1987,
among others). Particularly, two natural dual points of view appear in claims prob-
lems: awards and losses. In the former case, each agent is worried about “what
she receives”, while in the latter one, she cares about “what is not satisfied of her
claims”.
In the current approach, mediation combines these two dual points of view with the
imposition of fair principles. Specifically, a mediator proposes a way of distributing
the endowment, F , among those that satisfy the legitimate principles P on which
the society has agreed, so that the admissible rules should fulfil P and propose an
allocation between F and its dual rule, Fd .
Then, we study the consequences of establishing a warranty in awards (lower
bound on awards), and the obligation of incurring minimum losses (lower bound
on losses, or, equivalently, an upper bound on awards). The idea of establish-
ing a lower bound on awards can be found in many papers on claims problems
(O’Neill 1982; Herrero and Villar 2001, 2002; Moulin 2002; Moreno-Ternero and
Villar 2004; Giménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil 2014; Dominguez 2013). In fact,
the formal definition of a rule already includes both upper and lower bounds
on awards by requiring that no agent receives more than her claim or less than
zero. Actually, there are many situations where this warranties appear: bankruptcy
law, inheritance, divorce, the universal basic income (Tobin et al. 1967; Noguera
2010). On the other hand, since claims problems can be faced from the point of
view of the incurred losses, the notion of an upper bound on awards naturally
arises.
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From this reasoning, the so-called Double Recursive Process provides a manner to
solve claims problems as the recursive application of both:1
• a lower bound,which guarantees that each agent should receive at least the smallest
amount recommended by all the admissible allocations; and
• an upper bound, which limits the awards an agent should receive by the highest
amount provided by these allocations.
Our process can be summarized in the following way: Given a claims problem
(E, c), a mediator determines a set of legitimate principles P and a criterion D to
choose a particular rule F that delimits the set of admissible proposals. Accordingly,
the agents compute their minimal expected award (that we call F-right) among all
admissible proposals; and accept this award. At the same time, they also compute their
maximal expected award (that we call F-utopia); and give up any claims greater than
their utopia. If there are available resources after distributing the rights, the process
continues until the endowment is exhausted. We show that this process ends at the
midpoint of the two dual proposals, F and Fd . This result provides a new justification
of the average of two extreme and dual ways of distributing the endowment.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents the preliminaries, and Sect. 3
provides our approach. Sections 4 and 5 contain our main definitions and results,
respectively. Section 6 applies them to different legitimate principles sets, and Sect. 7
summarizes our final remarks. Finally, the Appendices gather the technical proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Given a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a claims problem is a pair (E, c) ∈ R+ ×Rn+
such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E, where E is the endowment, that represents the quantity of
a perfectly divisible good to be allocated to the agents, and for each i ∈ N , ci is the
claim that agent i has on the endowment E . We will denote by C = ∑i∈N ci the
aggregate claim. B represents the set of all claims problems.
A rule (claims problems solution) is a function, ϕ : B → Rn+, such that for each
(E, c) ∈ B, satisfies:
1.
∑
i∈N ϕi (E, c) = E (efficiency); and
2. 0 ≤ ϕi (E, c) ≤ ci ,∀i ∈ N (non-negativity and claim-boundedness).
Following Thomson (2013), in claims problems, no claimant should be asked to
pay (non-negativity), no claimant should be awarded more than his claim (claim-
boundedness) and the distributions must be balanced: the sum of the awards should
be equal to the endowment (efficiency).
Each claims problem can be faced from two points of view: those of awards and
losses. Thus, we have two dual positions depending on whether we are focused on
awards or on the unsatisfied demand, L = ∑i∈N ci − E . Given a rule ϕ, its dual
rule distributes “what is missing” in the same way that ϕ divides “what is available”
(Aumann and Maschler 1985). Formally,
1 The recursive application of a lower bound has been used by Alcalde et al. (2005), Dominguez and
Thomson (2006) and Dominguez (2013).
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The dual of a rule ϕ, denoted by ϕd , is defined by setting for each (E, c) ∈ B and
each i ∈ N , ϕdi (E, c) = ci − ϕi (L , c).
It is straightforward to check that the duality operator is well defined, since for
each (E, c) ∈ B, (L , c) ∈ B and if ϕ satisfies efficiency, non-negativity and claim-
boundedness, so does ϕd . It is also clear that (ϕd)d = ϕ.
2.1 Rules
In this paper we will focus on some particular rules: the Proportional, the Constrained
Equal Awards, and the Constrained Equal Losses rules.
The Proportional (P) rule recommends a division of the endowment proportionally
to the claims: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N ,
Pi (E, c) = ci
C
E .
The Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) rule (Maimonides, twelfth century, among
others) recommends equal awards to all agents, subject to no one receiving more than
her claim: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N ,
CEAi (E, c) ≡ min{ci , μ},
where μ is chosen so that
∑
i∈N min{ci , μ} = E .
The Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL), discussed by Maimonides (Aumann
and Maschler 1985), is the dual of the Constrained Equal Awards (Herrero and Villar
2001). Specifically, it chooses the awards vector at which all agents incur equal losses,
subject to no one receiving a negative amount: for each (E, c) ∈ B and each i ∈ N ,
CELi (E, c) ≡ max{0, ci − μ},
where μ is chosen so that
∑
i∈N max{0, ci − μ} = E .
Note that the dual of the Proportional rule is itself (this property is known as
self-duality, see Sect. 2.2).
For the sake of facilitate the understanding of the mentioned rules, we provide the
graphical representation (in the two agents case) of these rules, and a simple numerical
example.
Example 1 Consider now the claims problem (E, c) = (15, (8, 12)). Table 1 shows
the proposals of the different rules we have introduced.
Table 1 Proposals given by
rules, (E, c) = (15, (8, 12)) P CEA CEL
(6,9) (7.5,7.5) (5.5,9.5)
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Fig. 1 The Proportional rule
Fig. 2 The CEA and CEL rules
In Figs. 1 and 2 we show the path defined by the above mentioned rules. Then, for
a given claims problem (E, c) ∈ B with two agents, the proposed solution is obtained
where this path intersects the efficient boundary x1 + x2 = E .
Note that the more properties are required by a society, the fewer the number of
admissible rules.
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2.2 Properties
We present in this section some properties on the rules that will be useful in our
discussion.
Resource monotonicity (Curiel et al. 1987; Young 1987) demands that if the
endowment increases, then all individuals should get at least what they received ini-
tially. Note that, no rule violating this property has been proposed in claims problems
literature. Otherwise we could have situations where an increment of the endowment
would cause some disadvantages to certain agents. This property is stated as follows:
for each (E, c) ∈ B and each E ′ ∈ R+ such that C > E ′ > E, then, for each i ∈ N ,
ϕi (E
′, c) ≥ ϕi (E, c).
Order preservation (Aumann and Maschler 1985) requires that agents with higher
claims should receive, and lose, at least as much as agents with lower claims do: for
each (E, c) ∈ B, and each i, j ∈ N , such that ci ≥ c j , then
ϕi (E, c) ≥ ϕ j (E, c), and ci − ϕi (E, c) ≥ c j − ϕ j (E, c).
Composition up (Moulin 2000) states that if after havingdistributed the endowment,
this increases, then a rule recommends the same if (i) we cancel the initial distribution
and apply the rule to the revised problem, or (ii) we let agents keep their initial
awards, adjust their claims down by these amounts, and re-apply the rule to allocate
the increment of the endowment. For each (E, c) ∈ B, each E ′ ∈ R+ such that
C > E ′ > E , then
ϕ(E ′, c) = ϕ(E, c) + ϕ(E ′ − E, c − ϕ(E, c)).
Self-duality (Aumann and Maschler 1985) demands that a rule recommends the
same allocation for a claims problem (E, c)whendividing “what is available” (awards)
or “what is missing” (losses). That is, the rule coincides with its dual: for each (E, c)∈
B,
ϕ(E, c) = ϕd(E, c).
Table 2 summarizes the properties that fulfil the solutions we work on.
Table 2 Properties and rules
C E A C E L P
Resource monotonicity Yes Yes Yes
Order preservation Yes Yes Yes
Composition up Yes Yes Yes
Self-duality No No Yes
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:357–375 363
3 Mediation
Our notion of mediation is given by both a set of properties and an admissible zone
that selects some of the rules that satisfy those properties. First, a group of properties
are accepted by a particular society (either these properties can be assumed by the
agents involved in the problem, or they can be established by law).2 Then, among the
rules fulfilling these properties, a reference rule F and its dual rule Fd delimit the
set of proposals that are admissible by a particular mediator. In this sense, mediation
involves:
1. a set of legitimate principles (properties) P;
2. a criterion D that selects a reference rule F, satisfying the properties in P; and
3. an admissible zone delimited by rule F and its dual Fd .
In Sect. 6 we propose the Lorenz domination as the criterion to be used in order to
select the reference rule F. So, we consider first a society in which the distribution
of the endowment must be based on the selected reference rule, that delimits a set of
admissible allocations for a specific mediator. Next, we formally present our model.
Definition 1 A claims problem with mediation is a triplet (E, c, F), wherein
(E, c) ∈ B, and F is a fixed rule determined from a set of principles P upon which a
particular society has agreed. LetBF be the set of all claims problems with mediation.
Then, we identify the mediator with the rule F, that will delimit the admissible
zone. Although F depends on the set P of legitimate principles, and the criterion D
used, F = F(P,D),we omit this fact in the notation, unless needed.We now formally
define the admissible rules for a given mediator.
Definition 2 A rule ϕ : B → Rn+ is said to be admissible for mediator F = F(P,D)
if ϕ satisfies all properties in P and for all i ∈ N ,
min{Fi (E, c), Fdi (E, c)} ≤ ϕi (E, c) ≤ max{Fi (E, c), Fdi (E, c)}.
Let (F) denote the set of admissible rules for mediator F.
Example 2 (Proportional mediator) Consider a mediator such that she asks the rules
to fulfill self-duality and composition-up. In this case, the only rule that satisfies these
properties is the Proportional. So that, F = P. Since this solution is self-dual, F =
Fd , the only admissible rule is the Proportional one. In this case, the criterion of the
mediator determines directly the solution.
Example 3 (Egalitarian mediator) Consider a mediator such that every rule is
accepted and assume that the criterion to select one of the rules (see Sect. 6) determines
F = C E A. Then, the admissible rules are those whose proposals for each agent i are
between the values C E Ai (E, c) and C E Li (E, c).
2 For instance, “any bankruptcy rule that is in linewith the existing laws as described in theUSABankruptcy
Code is necessarily population monotonic” (Grahn and Voorneveld 2002).
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For instance, if (E, c) = (15, (8, 12)), the admissible rules consist of the proposals
within the set {(a, b) ∈ R2 : a + b = 15 : 5.5 ≤ a ≤ 7.5}, see Fig. 2. In this case
the distribution of the endowment is undetermined and a process is needed to obtain
a solution for the claims problem.
4 The double recursive process
Given the set of admissible rules for mediator F, (F), we can obtain a minimal and
a maximal level of awards that each agent should receive on the basis of the ordinary
meaning of a guarantee. The maximal level on awards implies a limit on the losses the
agent incurs. In this sense, we can associate to every claims problem with mediation
two bounds on the awards each agent should receive:
• the F-rights value, which is a lower bound on awards that provides each agent the
smallest amount recommended to her by all admissible rules (seeGiménez-Gómez
and Marco-Gil 2014); and
• the F-utopia value, which is an upper bound that limits the awards that each agent
can receive to the highest amount recommended to her by all admissible rules.
Definition 3 Given (E, c, F) ∈ BF , the F-rights value, r , is for each i ∈ N ,
ri (E, c, F) = min
ϕ∈(F){ϕi (E, c)}.
Definition 4 Given (E, c, F) ∈ BF , the F-utopia value, u, is for each i ∈ N ,
ui (E, c, F) = max
ϕ∈(F){ϕi (E, c)}.
Remark 1 Given a particular claims problem (E, c) the admissible rule that provides
the F-rights (F-utopia) for agent i, could be different from the admissible rule that
provides the F-rights (F-utopia) for agent j 	= i .
The F-rights can be understood as the part of the claims that are not disputed (an
idea that has been already used in claims problems (see, for instance, Aumann and
Maschler 1985)), so that it should be ensured to each agent. Furthermore, assigning
to each agent her F-rights (as we have defined it) is compatible with the existing
endowment E, that is
∑
i∈N ri ≤ E . Moreover, all the admissible rules recommend to
each agent at least this amount. As, in general, the sum of the agents’ F-rights does not
exhaust the endowment, a recursive process arises in a natural way in order to obtain an
efficient allocation: we can allocate her F-rights to any agent, and then proceed again
in the new problem defined by the remaining estate (E minus the allocated amounts),
and the claims resulting from subtracting to the initial ones the amount which has
already been granted (ci − ri ). As we will see (Example 5) this process may end up
at one of the extremes of the admissible zone, defined by the reference rule F and its
dual.
By applying the idea of guaranteeing a minimum amount on losses rather than
awards, we propose truncate the claims by the maximum amount that each agent can
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expect to receive, the F-utopia. The idea of truncate the claims is not new and, in fact,
it is also commonly assumed that the part of the claims that are not feasible should
not to be considered in the problem (see, for instance, Aumann and Maschler 1985).
Therefore, we define an iterative process, that we call the Double Recursive Process
in which, at any step, each agent receives her F-rights and, at the same time, her claim
is truncated by her F-utopia.
Definition 5 The Double Recursive Process, DR P , associates for each (E, c, F) ∈
BF and each i ∈ N ,





where for each step m ∈ N, ri (Em, cm, F) is defined in the following way:
step 1, for m = 1, define (E1, c1) = (E, c) and compute
ri (E




1, c1, F) = max
ϕ∈(F){ϕi (E
1, c1)}.
step m, for m ≥ 2, define





cmi = ui (Em−1, cm−1, F) − ri (Em−1, cm−1, F),
and compute
ri (E




m, cm, F) = max
ϕ∈(F){ϕi (E
m, cm)}.
As shown in Theorem 1 this process completely exhausts the endowment E, so
it provides an efficient allocation. In Example 4 we show this process in a particular
claims problem with mediation.
Example 4 Consider the Egalitarianmediator as in Example 3, and the claims problem
(E, c) = (15, (8, 12)).We know that the reference rule is F = C E A, so Fd = C E L .
Then,
m = 1 : E1 = 15; c1 = (8, 12);
C E A(E1, c1) = (7.5, 7.5); C E L(E1, c1) = (5.5, 9.5);
r(E1, c1, F) = (5.5, 7.5); u(E1, c1, F) = (7.5, 9.5).
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m = 2 : E2 = 2; c2 = (2, 2);
C E A(E2, c2) = (1, 1) = C E L(E2, c2);
r(E2, c2, F) = (1, 1) = u(E2, c2, F).
m = 3 : E3 = 0; c3 = (0, 0).
Therefore, DR P(E, c) = (5.5, 7.5) + (1, 1) = (6.5, 8.5).
5 Main results
Our first result proves that the Double Recursive Process ends at the midpoint of the
allocations provided by F and Fd .
Theorem 1 For each (E, c, F) ∈ BF
DR P(E, c) = F(E, c) + F
d(E, c)
2
Proof See Appendix A. unionsq
The next theorem establishes that the final allocation provided by theDouble Recur-
sive Process corresponds with the average of the F-rights and the F-utopia. The proof
is obtained as part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For each (E, c, F) ∈ BF
DR P(E, c) = r(E, c, F) + u(E, c, F)
2
Theorem1 shows that theDouble Recursive Process proposes themidpoint between
the two rules which represent extreme and opposite ways of sharing awards among
claimants. As a consequence, it can be stated that the rationing of the endowment
obtained by the recursive double imposition of the F-rights and F-utopia, neither
favours nor hurts any particular agent. Following Thomson and Yeh (2008),
“When two rules express opposite points of view on how to solve a bankruptcy
problem, it is natural to compromise between them by averaging”.
Note that, from Theorem 1, we obtain that the Double Recursive Process satisfies
efficiency, non-negativity and claim-boundedness. Furthermore, the following result
shows that it also fulfils self-duality, whatever the legitimate principles set, P , and the
reference rule, F , are.
Proposition 1 For each (E, c, F) ∈ BF , DR P(E, c) = c − DR P(L , c).
Proof See Appendix B. unionsq
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In our context of claims problems with mediation, we understand by a process any
algorithm that associates to each problem (E, c, F) ∈ BF an allocation satisfying
efficiency, non-negativity and claim-boundedness. For instance, apart fromourDouble
Recursive Process, wemay define a process that in each step assigns theF-rights value,
and solves the residual problem, as shown by next example.
Example 5 Consider the Egalitarianmediator as in Example 3, and the claims problem
(E, c) = (15, (8, 12)).We know that the reference rule is F = C E A, so Fd = C E L .






where Em is as in Definition 5, and cm = cm−1 − rm−1 for all m. Then
m = 1 : E1 = 15; c1 = (8, 12);
C E A(E1, c1) = (7.5, 7.5); C E L(E1, c1) = (5.5, 9.5);
r1 = r(E1, c1, F) = (5.5, 7.5).
m = 2 : E2 = 2; c2 = (2.5, 4.5);
C E A(E2, c2) = (1, 1); C E L(E2, c2) = (0, 2);
r2 = r(E2, c2, F) = (0, 1)
m = 3 : E3 = 1; c3 = (2.5, 3.5);
C E A(E3, c3) = (0.5, 0.5); C E L(E3, c3) = (0, 1);
r3 = r(E3, c3, F) = (0, 0.5)
m = k :
rk = r(Ek, ck, F) = (0, (1/2)k−2)
Therefore, Mr (E, c) = (5.5, 9.5), that does not coincide with the allocation pro-
vided by the Double Recursive Process, DR P(E, c) = (6.5, 8.5).
Now, let us consider the “extra awards” each agent receives from a process, i.e.,
the amount of awards each agent gets apart from what she has guaranteed, ri (E, c).
Given that the process we are looking for is self dual, we ask that the extra amount
each individual receives after rights should be the same in a problem (E, c) and in its
dual problem (L , c). We call this property dual right-egalitarian:
Mi (E, c) − ri (E, c) = Mi (L , c) − ri (L , c).
Now, by combining self-duality and dual right-egalitarian, we obtain a character-
ization of the Double Recursive Process.
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Theorem 3 If M is a process such that for each (E, c, F) ∈ BF , satisfies self-duality
and dual right-egalitarian, then M(E, c) = DR P(E, c).
Proof See Appendix C. unionsq
Finally, note that there are some properties that are always satisfied by the result of
this process independently of the legitimate principles set,P , and the reference rule, F.
Among the properties we have introduced in Sect. 2.2, the Double Recursive Process
fulfils: resource monotonicity, order preservation and self-duality. Nonetheless, other
properties depend on P and/or on F, as the next example shows with respect to the
composition-up property.
Example 6 Consider F = C E A (the Egalitarianmediator) and the problems (E, c) =
(100, (80, 120)) and (E ′, c) = (120, (80, 120)). Then,
DR P(E, c) = (40, 60), DR P(E ′, c) = (50, 70)
and DR P(20, (40, 60)) = (5, 15).
So composition-up is not fulfilled. Now, consider F = P (the Proportional mediator).
In this case, DR P provides an allocation that always coincides with the proportional
one, so it satisfies composition-up.
6 The mediator: reference rules
In Sect. 3 we have introduced the notion of mediation as a specific rule F, that fulfills
a set of legitimate principles, P, and determines the set of admissible rules. Now, we
provide some rationale about the selection of the reference rule, F, by the mediator.
As we have mentioned in Sect. 1, the Lorenz criterion is a usual equity manner of
comparing rules (see Thomson 2012; Bosmans and Lauwers 2011). Under some usual
conditions, this criterion provides a comparison of rules so that if a rule ϕ Lorenz
dominates a rule ψ , this means that ϕ favours smaller claimants relative to larger
ones. Under such a perspective, the Lorenz maximal rule can be considered as the
more equitable one. Then, once the legitimate principles have been defined by society,
the Lorenz-optimality can be the criterion the mediator uses to select the reference
rule F. We call this Lorenz mediation, which involves: (1) a set of properties, P
(legitimate principles); and (2) an admissible zone delimited by the Lorenz maximal
rule in P, F = L, and its dual rule, Fd = Ld . Therefore, as a consequence of
Theorem 1 we obtain that the Double Recursive Process coincides with the average
of the Lorenz maximal and its dual.
Then, by varying the set of legitimate principles, the reference rule may change and
so the result of the DR P process. The following example and results show this fact.3
Example 7 Let us consider the following sets of legitimate principles, and the Lorenz-
maximal in each one of them:
3 The results about Lorenz maximal rules provided in this example can be found in Bosmans and Lauwers
(2011) and Thomson (2012).
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• If P1 = {efficiency, claim-boundedness, non-negativity}, L = C E A.
• If P2 = {efficiency, claim-boundedness, non-negativity, composition-up, self-
duality}, L = P.
Proposition 2 Given a society with legitimate principles P, such that a Lorenz max-
imal L exists, if F = L, then for each (E, c, F) ∈ BF ,




By applying the result in Proposition 2 to the different sets of legitimate principles
introduced in previous example, we obtain the following:
Corollary 1 We consider the sets of legitimate principles defined in Example 7. Then,
(a) If P = P1, DR P(E, c) = C E A(E,c)+C E L(E,c)2
(b) If P = P2, DR P(E, c) = P(E, c)
7 Final remarks
In this paper, we have established that the application of a recursive process, in contexts
where two dual reference criterion F and Fd appear, retrieves the midpoint between
these two dual positions. This fact, apart from its own logic, allows us to anticipate
the result of such negotiations. Moreover, we also find that this process concludes at
the midpoint between the F-rights and the F-utopia—that is, the midpoint between
the worst and the best position, among the proposals given by the admissible rules.
Two interesting questions remain open. On the one hand, what happens if instead
of considering an admissible zone delimited by a reference function, F , and its dual,
Fd , we consider that this zone can be delimited by two any reference functions, F and
G, satisfying P . In this case the admissible rules are those satisfying P such that:
min{Fi (E, c), Gi (E, c)} ≤ ϕi (E, c) ≤ max{Fi (E, c), Gi (E, c)}.
The Double Recursive Process may be adapted to this situation merely by changing
Fd by G in Definition 5. We denote by DR P2 this new process. Next proposition
tells us that the result in Theorem 1 remains true if we consider two-agent prob-
lems. Nevertheless, we cannot generalize this result to n-agent problems, as shown in
Example 8.
Proposition 3 For each two-agent claims problems (E, c) ∈ B, and given two any
reference rules, F and G,
DR P2(E, c) = F(E, c) + G(E, c)
2
Proof See Appendix D. unionsq
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Example 8 Consider that the admissible zone is delimited by the Constrained Equal
Awards,C E A, andProportional, P, rules. Let us consider the claimsproblem (E, c) =





, 34 + 7
12




which does not coincide with the average of C E A(E, c) = ( 1003 , 1003 , 1003 ), and
P(E, c) = (25, 35, 40).
On theother hand, as suggested by a referee “sometimes, the lower bound r(E, c, F)
may be considered as too low (or even to high), we would like to impose an adjusted
F-right rα(E, c, P) = α ·r(E, c, F).” So, what happens if we consider some speed in
the recursive process by means of a parameter α? This is an interesting question since
it seems that some relationship between the end of the recursive process and some
convex combination of the rules F and Fd should exist. Nevertheless, no general
relationship is fulfilled.
Finally, in Sect. 6 we have provided a way of selecting the reference rule F, that
coincides with the Lorenz maximal rule in a specific set of legitimate principles.
However, there are other possibilities for comparing rules and, so that, defining such
a rule (see, for instance, the Rawls criterion Rawls 1971). In any case, the Double
Recursive Process ends at the midpoint of any two dual reference rules, F and Fd .
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of this result is based on a fact and two lemmas. Throughout the appendix,
we will consider (E, c, F) ∈ BF . For notational convenience, for all m ∈ N, we
denote rm = r(Em, cm, F) and um = u(Em, cm, F).







umi = 2Em .
Lemma 1 For all m ∈ N, m > 1,
∑
i∈N
[umi + rmi ] =
∑
i∈N
cmi = Cm .
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By the definition of the Double Recursive Process, we know that































As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, we find that at every step of the Double
Recursive Process, m ∈ N, m > 1, the half of the claims sum coincides with both the
endowment and the total loss incurred at this step of the process,
∑
i∈N
cmi − Em = Em =
Cm
2
Finally, the next lemma states that each agent’s claim at every step different from the
initial one, coincides with sum of the rights and the utopia.
Lemma 2 For all m ∈ N, m > 1
cmi = umi + rmi .
Proof We know that
∑
i∈N
























cmi − Em, cm, F
)}







cmi − Em, cm, F
)}
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cmi − Em, cm, F
)
= cmi − umi ,
and the result holds.
unionsq
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1








































DR Pi (E, c) = r1i +
u1i − r1i
2
= ui (E, c, F) + ri (E, c, F)
2
.
Now, from definition of F-rights and F-utopia values, ui (E, c, F) + ri (E, c, F) =
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Let (E, c, F) ∈ BF a claims problem with mediation. By duality,
F(L , c) = c − Fd(E, c) and Fd(L , c) = c − F(E, c).
Since





DR Pd(E, c) = c − F(L , c) + F
d(L , c)
2
= c − c − F
d(E, c) + c − F(E, c)
2
= F(E, c) + F
d(E, c)
2
= DR P(E, c).
unionsq
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3
Let (E, c, F) ∈ BF a claims problem with mediation. If M is a process that fulfils
self-duality, we know that
Mi (E, c) = Mdi (E, c) = ci − Mi (L , c).
On the other hand, by applying the dual right-egalitarian property
Mi (E, c) − ri (E, c) = Mi (L , c) − ri (L , c).
By adding both equalities, we obtain
2Mi (E, c) = ci + ri (E, c) − ri (L , c) = ci + ri (E, c) − ci + ui (E, c)
= ri (E, c) + ui (E, c),
so,
M(E, c) = ri (E, c) + ui (E, c)
2
= DR P(E, c).
unionsq
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
Let (E, c) ∈ B be a two-agent claims problem, and consider that there exist two
reference functions F and G that delimit the admissible zone of proposals. That is, a
rule ϕ is admissible if satisfies the properties in P and
min{Fi (E, c), Gi (E, c)} ≤ ϕi (E, c) ≤ max{Fi (E, c), Gi (E, c)}.
Suppose, without loss of generality that c1 ≤ c2 and that F1(E, c) < G1(E, c). For
notational convenience, for all m ∈ N, we write rm = pr(Em, cm, F, G), um =
u(Em, cm, F, G), Fm = F(Em, cm), and Gm = G(Em, cm). By the definition of the
Double Recursive Process,
• m = 1, E1 = E; c1 = c.
Since F11 < G
1
1, r
1 = (F11 , G12); u1 = (G11, F12 ).• m = 2, E2 = E − F11 − G12; c2 = (G11 − F11 , F12 − G12).
Note that, F11 + F12 = G11 + G12. So,
G11 − F11 = F12 − G12, and c21 = c22.
Hence,
F21 = F21 = G21 = G21 =
E − F11 − G21
2
.
Therefore, since E = G11 + G21,
DR P21(E, c) = F11 +









DR P22(E, c) = E − F1 + G1
2
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